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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GALE BARNEY JUDD, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
ROWLEY'S CHERRY HILL ORCHARDS, 
INC., a Corporation, and 
E. W. ELFAWN WALL, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
case No. 16,332 
Litigation in this case arises out of an action for 
personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of an 
automobile collision between the plaintiff, Gale Barney Judd, 
and the defendant, Elfawn HaL. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Jury trial was held on December 11th and 12th, 1978. 
After presentation of all the evidence and in answer to "special 
interrogatories" the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff 
finding the defendant 70% at fault and the plaintiff 30% at fault. 
The jury awarded total damages for the plaintiff in the amount of 
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$25,000.00; special damages were awarded in the amount of 
$15,000.00 and general damages were awarded in the amount of 
$10,000.00. In accordance with Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Section 78-27-38, regarding the determination of damages in 
a comparative negligence case, the court then reduced the total 
amount of damages to be awarded the plaintiff by 30% and entered 
judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of 
$17,500.00. Plaintiff's motions to amend the judgment or for 
a new trial were subsequently denied and this appeal was filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents seek to have the jury verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff affirmed and the damage award, as 
determined by the jury and properly reduced by the court, sus-
tained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record supports the following statement of facts. 
Plaintiff and defendant, as operators of motor vehicles, I 
were involved in a col lis ion January 20, 1977, on a country road- I 
! 
way. The roadway was 21 feet wide and consisted of loosely packed 1 
gravel that had been oiled 2 to 3 days before. R248, Exhibits 3-14.[ 
•s i The drivers were proceeding in opposite directions. " 1 
I 
they approached each other the vehicles were both traveling in t~! 
middle of the road, as was the usual practice in that area. R39l 1 
-2-
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plaintiff reacted by turning right and slamming on her brakes. 
R246 After plaintiff turned her vehicle right and the brakes 
took hold, plaintiff was still left of center. Exhibit 14. 
Defendant reacted by applying his brakes but did not turn right. 
The parties skidded to a head-on collision. 
Trooper Lynn Richardson, the investigating officer, 
made measurements and tied his reference point to a hay stack. 
R371 Defendant had another patrolman, Gary Johnson, attempt to 
check Lynn Richardson's measurements and prepare a map of the 
scene. Trooper Richardson refused to furnish his field notes 
to Trooper Johnson. R370 The hay stack, which was the refer-
ence point, had been moved from the time of the accident to the 
time Trooper Johnson tried to verify measurements. R371 
The jury unanimously concluded that defendant was 70% 
at fault and plaintiff was 30% at fault in causing the collision. 
R462 
Plaintiff suffered two fractured knee caps in the acci-
dent and a dislocation of the right ankle. Six months after the 
accident, as testified by Dr. David C. Flinders, plaintiff's 
physician, plaintiff told him in the course of a physical examination 
for a L,D,S, Mission, that she walked or jogged one mile a day with 
leg pains and was able to sat~~£acLurily perform her duties as a 
practical nurse without pain. R88 That because of an incomplete 
reduction of the fracture to the right knee cap, the knee cap was 
removed by Dr. Eugene H. Chapman. R 307 Dr. Edward Spencer testi-
-3-
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fied that, in his opinion, the ankle after being reduced was 
not impaired. R360 He also testified that the left knee did 
not need further corrective surgery and after the removal of 
the patella she would be able to perform her household duties, 
run and jog, work as a practical nurse and in effect return to 
substantially normal activities. R357, R359, R360 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
I THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE SUBMISSION 1 
OF THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY, 
POINT II 
THE JURY DID NOT ERR TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFF 
IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF 1 S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 6, 7, 
AND 9, AND IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WA~ I 
GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. I 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO, 
6 TO THE JURY. 
Points I, II, and III refer to the submission of fact 
to the jury as to negligence of the parties under Utah 1 s compara· 
tive negligence law. 
Because they all involve the same principle they will 
-4-
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be discussed simultaneously. 
The court in instruction No. 4 informed the jury as 
to what constituted negligence. JIFU 15.1 
The court in instruction No. 6 correctly set forth 
the law that it was the duty of each driver to use reasonable 
care under the circumstances in driving their vehicles to avoid 
danger to themselves and otherc ar·~ to observe and be aware of 
the condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, and other 
existing conditions; in that regard, they were obliged to observe 
due care in respect to: 
1. To use reasonable care to keep a lookout for other 
vehicles, or other conditions reasonably to be anticipated. 
2. To keep their motor vehicles under reasonably safe 
and proper control. 
3. To drive at such a speed as was safe, reasonable 
and prudent under the circun.stances, having due regard to the 
width, surface and condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, 
the visibility, and any actual or potential hazards then existing. 
4. To drive their motor vehicles on their own right 
side of the highway, JIFU 21.1 Pages 73-75. 
On each one of these specific points, above set forth, 
there existed disputed evidence that the jury was required to 
resolve. 
As stated by the court in instruction No. 11, the jury 
was the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and 
-5-
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the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testi-
mony and credibility of the witnesses the jury had a right to 
take into consideration their bias, their interest in the result 
of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify 
fairly, if any is shown. The jury could consider the witnesses' 
deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of their 
statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of 
it, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and 
their capacity to remember. The jury could consider these matters 
together with all of the other facts and circumstances which the I 
jury could believe would have a bearing on the truthfulness or 
accuracy of the witnesses' statements. JIFU 3.2, Page 17. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8 AND IN 
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 AS 
REQUESTED WITH REGARD TO DAMAGES. 
The jury was adequately instructed regarding damages. 
Instruction No. 8 covered standar.l instructions on pain, suffe~ing.l 
impairment of bodily functions disability, impairment of earmng 
capacity, doctor bills, hospital bills, medication, loss of wages 
and future medical and hospital expenses. JIFU 90.1, 90.3, 90.6, 
90.8, 90.10 Pages 165-168. 
POINT V 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY lvERE NaT GROSSLY IN-
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADEQUATE, AND THE JURY DID NUT DISREGA!ZD THE GREAT WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE AND THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT IN THE AMOUNT 
AWARDED FOR DAMAGES, 
The general rule, supported by Utah case law, regard-
ing the setting aside of an inadequate verdict in an action for 
personal tort has been set out in 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, Sec. 
398, P. 533 and includes the following elements, the verdict •~ill 
be set aside only if: 
1. The amount is so inadequate as to indicate passion, 
prejudice, partiality, corruption, or disregard for the 
court's instructions; 
2. There was a vital misapprehension or mistake 
on the part of the jury; and 
3. It clearly appears from uncontradicted evidence 
that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable relation 
to the loss suffered by the plaintiff. 
In support of the concept that the mere allegation of 
excessive or inadequate damages is insufficient to require a new 
trial, the Supreme Court of Utah in Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d, 1; 
261 P.2d (1953) said: 
Appellant claims here that damages awarded were 
"so excessive as to appear prejudicial." Rule 59 (a) 
(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a 
new trial may be granted on grounds of excessive or 
inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. It is not enough, 
under this rule nor under the code provision which it 
supplanted, merely to allege that the amount itself is 
-7-
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excessive. The amount of the verdict is ordinarily a 
matter exclusively for the jury and on the ground of 
adequacy of the verdict alone, the court may not inter-
fere with the jury's verdict unless it clearly appears 
that the award was rendered under misunderstanding or 
prejudice. 
When the record is void of any indication of passion or 
prejudice, the amount of the award itself does not justify the 
conclusion that the award resulted from passion or prejudice. fu I 
Hanson v. General Builders Supply Company, 15 Utah 2d 143; 389 P.1a 
61 (1964) the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
The award 
General damages of $22,500 were awarded by the I 
jury, which to you or me might seem somewhat exaggerated.! 
and, depending on anyone else's personal opinion, may 
have been poor judgment on the part of the veniremen. I 
The urgence on appeal, however, is that the verdict re- 1 
fleeted passion and prejudice against the defendants. 
There is nothing in the record that would justify this I 
court in arriving at such a conclusion ..... Under I 
Rule 59 (a) ( 5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the ex-
cessiveness of damages must appear to have been "given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice." I 
of $25,000.00 being $10,000.00 for general damages and 
$15,000.00 for special damages, is not a clear indication of: 
1. The jury's disregard of competent evidence, or 
2. The influence of passion or prejudice. 
As stated in Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, (1978) 
the Supreme Court of Utah has held that the award, to be excessive 
or inadequate, must clearly (not speculatively) show a disregard 
for competent evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice: , 
Also, it is contended the court erred in denying r' 
a motion for a new trial under, Rule 59 (a) (5), U,R,C.:. 
That rule provides a new trial may be granted because 
of the award of excessive damages "appearing to have 
-8-
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been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
Generally, the amount of the verdict is a matter ex-
clusively for the ~ury and unless such an award clearly 
indicates the jury s disregard of competent evidence or 
the influence of passion or pre~udice, the trial court 
may not interfere with the jury s determination. 
In the absence of a clear indication of passion and 
prejudice or disregard for instructions, the jury verdict must 
stand and is not subject to additur or new trial. 
The assessment of damages is peculiarly within the 
prerogative of the jury to determine. 
In Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 113; 
388 P.2d 409 (1964) the Utah Supreme Court clearly explained the 
function and exclusive domain of the jury to determine damages: 
Due to their advantaged position in close prox-
imity to the trial, the parties and the witnesses; 
and their practical knowledge of the affairs of life 
as a background against which to weigh the evidence, 
the assessment of damages is something peculiarly 
within the prerogative of the jury to determine, and 
the court is extremely reluctant to interfere with 
their judgment in that regard. From the plaintiff's 
point of view, her insistence that the award is in-
adequate to her needs and desires is understandable. 
But we are obliged to look at the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. In doing so, 
we do not see it as to entirely beyond reason as to 
require that we upset it. 
Damages can only be assessed from the evidence presented, 
and when the verdict is within any reasonable appraisal of damages 
as shown by the evidence it should be permitted to stand. Bodon v. 
Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958) 
-9-
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POINT VI 
THE JURY DID NOT ERR IN THE AWARDING OF SPECIAL 
DAMAGES. 
Medical specials were stipulated as $8,335.08. As 
to the loss of earnings to tim0 or ~ial, the evidence w~s 
disputed as to plaintiff's ability to work and therefore, 
defendants contend the award was within the facts as established 
by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's conduct in directing the litigation 
in the instance action was in accordance with accepted practice 
and procedures. 
The instruction glven the jury regarding both parties' 
duties in operating their respective vehicles covered the matter 
adequately and in accordance with law. 
There was adequate testimony and evidence presented 
regarding the collision, to allow reasonable minds to differ in 
determining fault and damages. The trial court properly submittec 
the factual issues to the jury for determination. The jury is the 
sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of 
the evidence. There was substantial evidence to support the 
jury's verdict and award of damages. 
The trial court operated within the discretion granted 
-10-
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to it and did not corrnnit prejudicial error. 
Defendants respectfully request the court to support 
the procedural steps that are heretofore taken and allow the 
verdict of the jury as made to stand. 
·' ;u/ 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of August, 1979. 
\ )) ) 
//diJ;/:-~ 
\:::-'RAY H. IVIE, 
IVIE & YOlJt:IG 
Attorneys ~ Defendants and 
Respondents 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
··) tl<.! I certify that on the.~ day of August, 1979, I 
mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Respondents to Woodrow D. White, Attorney for Appellant, 
2121 South State Street, ) 
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